I. INTRODUCTION
A number of states have limitations on the growth rate of property value assessments.
1
The primary purpose of these limitations is to ensure that property tax burdens do not increase too quickly, especially during periods of rapidly rising housing prices. Despite their popularity, taxable value growth caps have the potential to generate several layers of undesirable outcomes. In addition to creating both horizontal and vertical inequities (Skidmore, Ballard, and Hodge, 2010; Hodge et al., forthcoming) , there is evidence that taxable value growth caps reduce household mobility (i.e., create a "lock-in" effect) as long-time property owners enjoying substantial tax burden reductions, relative to new homeowners, must forfeit their benefits once they move.
In this article we examine the degree to which Michigan's taxable value growth limit has created a "lock-in" effect in Detroit, Michigan. There are now several studies that examine the "lock-in" effect in other states and contexts. Our study offers several contributions to this body of research. First, we use detailed parcel-level data to examine the degree to which tax savings created by the taxable value growth cap affect the probability of property sale. Second, we look at this issue in the context of a different state (Michigan) and in a single jurisdiction (Detroit) in which all properties receive services from the same overlying government entities. Further, we consider the issue in the context of a faltering housing market. In Detroit, housing values have fallen dramatically in the wake of the Great Recession, and yet the differential in effective tax rates between long-time and new property owners created by the taxable value cap persists. Finally, we estimate lock-in effect across different property value groups and areas of the city where housing and neighborhood characteristics may differ substantially.
Although cities across North America have suffered during the Great Recession, Detroit is among the worst hit. As reported in Table 1 , information on the recession's impacts for the 100 largest U.S. metropolitan areas from the Brookings Metro Monitor report (Friedhoff and Kulkarni, 2013) shows that Detroit ranks well below comparable areas like Cleveland and Pittsburgh; only Youngstown is similar to Detroit.
In addition, 47 percent of property owners were delinquent in their tax payments in 2012 (MacDonald and Wilkinson, 2013) . Uncollected taxes amount to $131 million, or about 12 percent of the City of Detroit's general fund budget in FY2012. In 2013 Michigan Governor Snyder appointed an Emergency Financial Manager who subsequently sought bankruptcy protection for the City of Detroit. In December 2014 the City of Detroit emerged from Chapter 9 bankruptcy, with Judge Stephen Rhodes approving a plan to reduce $7 billion of the City's estimated $18 billion debt load. The bankruptcy came to a close within 15 months, much less time than many experts expected. While the bankruptcy provided a badly need debt and fiscal reset, Detroit policymakers are now turning their attention to larger socio-economic and long-run fiscal challenges in order to avoid the reemergence of financial problems in the future.
In particular, the property tax is of paramount concern. Of relevance for the present research and as we discuss in greater detail later, assessment practices in Detroit are equally as important as the taxable value cap in maintaining lower effective tax rates for owners with long tenure. According to parcel-level data provided by the City of Detroit Assessment Division, the average selling price of a single-family residential home in 2011 was just $7,000, evidence of a severely troubled housing market.
2 However, assessments have not kept pace with the rapidly declining housing market. As shown by Hodge, et al. (forthcoming) , assessed values are about five times higher than they should be if assessments accurately reflected market conditions. The persistence of lower effective tax rates for long-time homeowners is the result of assessors failing to Table 1 The Great Recession in Select Midwest Metropolitan Areas Source: Friedhoff and Kulkarni, 2013 reduce assessments as the housing market declined. It is in the context of bankruptcy, high delinquency, and misaligned assessments that we examine the degree to which the taxable value growth cap has reduced mobility and deterred housing market transactions. Detroit's current circumstances are extreme, but hardly unique. Detroit is not the only city that is experiencing fiscal challenges, which are in large part due to tax base erosion and the underfunding of retiree compensation. As one illustration, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emmanuel recently stated, "Should Chicago fail to get pension relief soon, we will be faced with a 2015 budget that will either double city property taxes or eliminate the vital services that people rely on."
3 Further, many cities, including Chicago, have some form of assessment growth limit, which may exacerbate the fiscal challenges by narrowing the property tax base and creating inefficiencies in the housing market. Understanding the effects of policies like assessment growth caps, even in an extreme circumstance such as Detroit, provides a useful contribution to policy discussions in other locations. Our evaluation provides evidence of a lock-in effect even in the midst of a faltering local housing market; if a lock-in effect persists in such adverse housing market conditions, it may persist in other markets as well. Further, such knowledge may be useful in averting crises in other cities.
II. MICHIGAN PROPERTY TAXATION AND THE DETROIT CONTEXT
In order to understand the "lock-in" effect, it is important to know the recent history of the property tax in Michigan. Prior to 1994 property taxation in Michigan had two key characteristics. First, public schools were financed almost exclusively through local property taxes. The substantial variation among school districts in the value of taxable property led to large differences among school districts in expenditure per student. Second, the overall level of property taxation was well above the national average. 4 These features were the source of dissatisfaction among voters and prompted a series of reform measures (Feldman, Courant, and Drake, 2003) .
In December 1993, Michigan voters adopted Proposal A. A key feature of this reform was the imposition of the taxable value cap, which limited the growth in property value for tax purposes to the rate of inflation or 5 percent, whichever is lower.
5 Over time, the 3 Lyman, Rick, 2013. "Chicago Pursues Deal to Change Pension Funding." The New York Times, December 4, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/us/chicago-pursues-deal-to-change-pension-funding.html?_r=0. 4 Data from the U.S. Census Bureau for state and local government finances are available online at http:// www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate.html. Before Proposal A became effective, property taxes typically accounted for about 41 percent of state and local tax revenues in Michigan, well above the national average of about 30 percent. After Proposal A, property taxes accounted for a percentage of Michigan revenues that was very close to the national average. Michigan's property taxes remained slightly above the national average when measured on a per-capita basis, but the difference between Michigan and the U.S. average was greatly reduced. 5 Prior to Proposal A, property tax revenues were limited by the Headlee Amendment (1978) . The Headlee Amendment was an earlier attempt at property tax reform (see Skidmore, Ballard, and Hodge (2010) for further discussion).
taxable value cap led to significant differentials between long-time and new property owners; this is especially true in places with relatively high property value growth (Skidmore, Ballard, and Hodge, 2010) . Along with the taxable value cap Proposal A also introduced a distinction between "homestead property" and "non-homestead property," where the homestead is defined as the homeowner's principal residence. For homestead property, Proposal A limited the statutory property tax millage rate that could be used for public school operating expenses. This is known as the "homestead exemption," since it does not apply to non-homestead property. For homestead properties, average statutory millage rates were reduced by about one-third. 6 However, the reduction in millage rates varied across jurisdictions; in 2010, homestead properties in the City of Detroit, where tax rates are particularly high, received a 17.83 mill reduction in their statutory rate relative to non-homestead properties (a 21 percent reduction). 7 The state government then added a 6 mill "state education tax," and increased sales and cigarette taxes to provide for the financing of elementary and secondary public education.
8
Because of the taxable value growth cap, it is important to make a distinction between the statutory property tax rate and the effective tax rate. The statutory tax rate is the millage rate applied to the tax base. Detroit taxpayers face statutory millage rates that are much higher than the statewide average; the total 2010 millage rate for owner-occupied residential properties was 67.32 mills per $1,000 of taxable value (TV).
9
For some homeowners, this tax burden is reduced by Proposal A. The effective tax rate is therefore a more accurate measure of tax burden than is the statutory tax rate. We define the Effective Tax Rate for residential property i using 6 The homestead exemption effectively equalized the statutory property tax millage rates for local school operating expenses on homestead properties across the state. This reduced disparities in overall statutory millage rates across jurisdictions, but it did not eliminate them. Substantial differences in overall millage rates remain, as a result of differences in millage rates between homestead and non-homestead properties, differences in the millage rates for school capital expenditures, and differences across municipal governments, county governments, and special districts. 7 According to Skidmore, Reese, and Kang (2012) , the average change in statutory tax rates among 152 communities in the five county region surrounding Detroit was 12.49 mills. 8 Proposal A also put severe restrictions on the ability of local units to increase property taxes on their own.
Thus, the financing of operating expenses for K-12 public education became highly centralized, whereas it had previously been highly decentralized. Also, funding formulas pushed in the direction of more equal per-student funding for operating expenses, although considerable gaps remain between the highest-and lowest-spending districts. See Papke (2005) for an excellent analysis of the effects of school finance reform on education outcomes. In the area of school capital expenses, local school districts still must rely on their own property taxes. As a result, funding disparities for school capital expenses are much larger than those for operating expenses. 9 One mill is defined as $1 per $1,000 of taxable value. millage rate multiplied by TV and SEV reflects the actual market value of the property.
10
Whenever a property is sold or transferred, TV equals SEV and the effective tax rate equals the statutory rate. Over time, however, effective tax rates for owner-occupied properties generally become lower than the statutory rate and differ considerably across these properties, depending on the degree to which the property is protected by the taxable value cap. Generally, the effective tax rate depends on the length of time an individual has owned the property T ( ) i , the rate of inflation multiplier (r), the appreciation (or depreciation) of property value V ( ) i , 11 the characteristics of the property C ( ) i , 12 and the location of the property L ( ) i . 13 The less a property owner benefits from the taxable value growth cap, the closer the effective rate will be to the full statutory rate.
Over time, the taxable value growth cap created large differentials between TV and SEV. In Detroit, the largest differential between citywide TV and SEV occurred in 2003, when TV was about 65 percent of SEV. In 2006 the difference in SEV and TV began to narrow and TV was 86.5 percent of SEV by 2011. Even though SEVs have fallen in recent years, as of 2010 about 30 percent of property owners had a TV to SEV gap of 30 percent or more; for an additional 34 percent the gap ranged from 1 percent to 29 percent. There was no gap between TV and SEV for about 35 percent of Detroit homeowners.
14 Figure 1 shows the paths of TV, SEV, and the average sales price of residential properties in Detroit since 2005. As shown in the figure, sales prices declined more than SEV, which in turn fell more than TV. Even after the bursting of the housing market bubble, a significant gap between aggregate TV and SEV remained for many homeowners. Sales prices stabilized in 2009 at about 20 percent of the pre-crash levels and have increased slowly in subsequent years. Figure 1 gives cause to question assessment practices in Detroit. State assessment guidelines require local units' assessments to reflect market value. However, Detroit has not sufficiently reduced assessments to fully match the housing value declines. As shown in Hodge et al. (2015) , assessed values of recently sold properties are much higher than sales prices; the average sale price of properties sold in 2010 was about $7,000 10 According to Michigan assessment guidelines, state equalized value should reflect 50 percent of market value. 11 Because of the taxable value cap, effective tax rates fall as the length of homeownership increases when property values and thus SEVs are rising faster than the rate of inflation. 12 Characteristics such as age of the house, lot size, house size, homestead, etc. are important determinants of the sale price (related to SEV and TV). 13 The location may influence the growth in state equalized value since properties in more desirable locations may experience larger growth in market values relative to properties in less desirable neighborhoods. 14 According to the Case-Schiller Home Price Index, housing prices in the City of Detroit increased by 93 percent from 1994 through 2005, before collapsing during the Great Recession. During the same period the Case-Schiller National Home Price index rose by 194 percent. Note also that housing prices were on the rise in Detroit even in the face of substantial population decline.
whereas average assessed value of these same properties is about $50,000. 15 Detroit property owners can individually file an appeal of their assessment with the Detroit Board of Review-Property Assessment and may further appeal an adverse decision to the Michigan Tax Tribunal. The process is time consuming and expensive, with no assurance of success. Nevertheless, the Michigan Tax Tribunal received 3,015 petitions from Detroit homeowners in 2012 (MacDonald and Wilkinson, 2013) . If the City were to assess property in a way that fully reflected recent sales, the benefits of the taxable value cap to long-time homeowners would be eliminated in most cases. Given current assessment practices, even in this faltering housing market many long-time property owners perceive a tax benefit that would be lost if they were to make a decision to move. It should be noted, however, that in 2012 the Michigan State Tax Commission learned of the potential issue with assessments and ordered an external sample reassessment to determine whether a full reassessment of all properties within the City was warranted.
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At time this article was written, the State Tax Commission's investigation was not yet complete. However, the assessment regime was not in question in 2010-2011 (the period under consideration), and thus it seems reasonable to think that homeowners based decisions on the assessment practices and the perceived "tax benefits" as shown on owners' tax bill, not on state assessment policy guidelines.
In Figure 2 we present average effective tax rates of owner-occupied residential properties at the neighborhood level. 17 The high effective tax rates in the extreme west and northeast areas of Detroit are likely the result of a number of factors. The outlying neighborhoods are predominantly single family, newer, and generally of higher socio-economic status than inner city areas. Perhaps more importantly, these areas have experienced more stable populations than other parts of the City; population has even increased in some these areas. Home sales activity in these areas has also been substantially higher than in the inner city and the TV for many of these properties has been reset, resulting in a higher effective tax rate.
With this overview of Michigan property tax environment and how policies play out in practice within Detroit, we now turn to a review of the most relevant literature on assessment growth limits.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
Much of the early empirical research on property tax limits, including taxable value growth caps, tended to focus on determining the degree to which these emerging fiscal constraints limited property tax revenue growth. 18 More recently, however, researchers have turned their attention to the distributional consequences of taxable value growth limits. We discuss several key articles to demonstrate that there are substantial tax differentials that can emerge from taxable value growth caps, thus demonstrating that there is potential for these differentials to generate housing market distortions. We then turn our attention to research that specifically examines the potential lock-in effect resulting from taxable value growth caps. Dye, McMillen, and Merriman (2006) address the implications of a recently imposed assessment growth cap in Cook County, Illinois. They demonstrate that a taxable value growth cap that protects residential owners (as in Cook County, Illinois) will lead to increased taxes for industrial and commercial property owners. They also show that homeowners with property that appreciates at a rate less than the cap will experience higher effective tax rates to make up for those who are protected. Dye and McMillen (2007) extend this work by developing a more formal theoretical framework to evaluate the effects of assessment caps on property taxes. Two key conclusions from this additional evaluation are that: (1) reassessment upon sale can make it costly for homeowners to move and may thus affect real estate markets; and (2) assessment limits can lead to higher taxes for some of the property owners the limit was meant to protect.
A. Assessment Growth Limits and Equity
Muhammad (2007) In 2008 the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy published a comprehensive report on property tax assessment limits and their use across the U.S. states. The report covers the institutional/legal aspects of such limits, the implications for the tax base and local government autonomy, equity issues and the inefficiencies that arise. The report concludes by offering potential alternatives to provide property tax relief to those in need, indicating that property tax assessment limits are "… the least effective, least equitable, and least efficient strategies available for providing tax relief (Haveman and Sexton, 2008, p. 37) ."
The body of research discussed above provides ample evidence of the significant inequities resulting from taxable value caps. Below, we discuss a closely related literature that has examined the effects of assessment growth caps on mobility.
B. Assessment Growth Limits and Mobility
The existing research on the potential impacts of assessment growth limits on mobility has focused on California and Florida. Specifically, O'Sullivan, Sexton, and Sheffrin (1995), Nagy (1997) , Stohs, Childs, and Stevenson (2001) , Wasi and White (2005) , Ferreira (2009), and Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy (2010) study the potential lock-in effect resulting from California's Proposition 13, and Stansel, Jackson, and Finch (2007) and Ihlanfeldt (2011) focus on Florida's Save Our Homes program. Consider first the California studies.
O 'Sullivan, Sexton, and Sheffrin (1995) use simulation methods to evaluate the potential effects of California's Proposition 13, concluding that assessment growth caps reduce mobility. Nagy (1997) and Wasi and White (2005) use data on mobility rates before and after the imposition of Proposition 13 in California relative to communi-ties in other states without a taxable value cap. With tax benefits accruing to stationary homeowners, the expectation was that relative mobility rates would decline after Proposition 13. However, the findings of the two studies differed, with Nagy failing to find evidence for a lock-in effect and Wasi and White (2005) supporting its existence. Stohs, Childs, and Stevenson (2001) use a cross-sectional approach to evaluate the lock-in effect. Specifically, they compare home sales rates in California metropolitan areas with metropolitan areas in other states, finding that sales rates are relatively lower in California -a result that is consistent with a lock-in effect. However, in the context of estimating effects using aggregated cross-sectional data, as pointed out by Ihlanfeldt (2011) , omitted variable bias is a concern.
Ferreira (2009) also examined residential mobility after Proposition 13, but focused on two amendments allowing transferability of the tax benefits to a new home for those who are age 55 or older. In a comparison of two age groups, he found that mobility for those over age 55 is about 25 percent higher than the mobility for those age 54 and younger.
There are also two studies that focus on Florida's assessment growth cap. Stansel, Jackson, and Finch (2007) compared average home tenure of full-time homeowners in 2002 and 2006 -before and after the implementation of the assessment growth limit. The researchers hypothesized that average home tenure would be longer in 2006 because homeowners would have accumulated tax savings and would be less willing to move. However, their comparisons failed to support this hypothesis. Ihlanfeldt (2011) used parcel-level data from Duval and Miami-Dade counties to examine the probability of home sale before and after the imposition of Amendment One, which enable homestead property owners to apply a portion of the tax savings from the assessment growth cap to a new home. He finds evidence that household mobility increased in the periods following the passage of Amendment One.
The present study adds to the literature in several ways. First, despite the fact that a number of studies demonstrate that a lock-in effect exists, there is still some question regarding the conditions under which a lock-in effect may emerge; our study focuses on the effects of a faltering real estate market, a context that is quite different than other studies. Second, we examine the issue using parcel-level data in a single city, Detroit, where all property owners interact with the same governmental units. Of the studies discussed above, only Ihlanfeldt (2011) uses parcel-level data. 19 An advantage of our parcel-level data is that we have detailed information about the parcel that includes tax payment, tax rate, and property characteristics. This allows us to calculate the precise tax saving resulting from the assessment growth cap for each parcel. A limitation is that we do not have much information about the owner except the number of years they have owned their property. Finally, we examine the lock-in effect on different home value groups and different locations within Detroit.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
As described in the literature review, effective tax rate differentials resulting from an assessment growth cap may generate inefficiencies; specifically, they have the potential to inhibit normal levels of residential market transactions and homeowner mobility. This phenomenon has come to be known as the "lock-in" effect. A homeowner who enjoys a substantial tax benefit may be less likely to sell because the cost of holding the property is low(er) and tax benefits are lost once the property is sold. Before turning to the empirical analysis, we first offer a detailed description of the data we use.
A. Data
The City of Detroit's Assessment Division provided parcel-level data for this research. The raw data include information for 444,183 real and personal property parcels in 2010, of which we focus on owner-occupied (i.e., homestead) residential properties. However, since our focus is on determining factors that influence a voluntary move, we exclude all property transfers to a financial institution due to mortgage foreclosure or a government entity due to tax foreclosure. 20 In total, there are 103,610 owner-occupied residential properties included in our evaluation. In order to match the previous owners' effective tax rate with sales activity, we combine the 2010 parcel-level property characteristics data with 2011 residential property sales data. 21 In addition to the property's effective tax rate, we include other variables such as years owned, house age and size, lot size, and indicator variable for whether a property is delinquent on property taxes, and three proxy measures for whether a homeowner is "underwater" on his/her mortgage (the amount owed exceeds the market value of the home). Since additional years of ownership lead to reductions in effective tax rates in the presence of an assessment growth cap, we must control for years of ownership in order to isolate the impact of the assessment growth cap.
In a declining market those who purchased their homes more recently are more likely to be underwater and incur greater difficulty in selling their property. However, in the case of Detroit, property values dropped so dramatically in the wake of the real estate crisis that they were too low for purchasers to obtain a typical home loan. In fact, nearly half of home sales in Detroit are for cash. Thus, as years of ownership decrease, the probability of selling increases due to a lower benefit from the assessment cap but may decrease due to the declining market. We therefore must also control for whether a homeowner is underwater. Unfortunately, we do not have a direct measure of whether a homeowner is underwater, so we must create proxy variables. To generate the underwater proxies, we must estimate the percent equity a homeowner has in his/her home, which we do using zip code level housing price index data obtained from Core Logic in combination with information on the length of ownership and the last sales price. The estimated percent equity a homeowner has in his/her property is based on a 30-year mortgage amortization schedule with an 8.5 percent annual rate of interest, and a 10 percent down payment. 22 Since in recent years about half of home sales have been cash transactions, we designate all home sales under a price of $40,000 during the period of analysis to be cash sales and thus have full equity. 23 This variable tends to be negative for homes purchased just before the housing market collapse. From this calculation of equity, we also create two indicator variables: (1) underwater (yes=1, no=0); (2) positive equity but less than 100 percent equity (yes=1, no=0); and (3) 100 percent equity (yes=1, no=0). We present estimates of sale probability using the negative equity indicator variable, the percent equity variable, and the negative equity and partial equity indicator variables (with full equity as the omitted category). Summary statistics for all of the variables we use in the analysis are provided in Table 2 , with definitions and details provided in Appendix 1.
B. Empirical Analysis
To examine the average change in length of ownership resulting from the assessment growth cap, a two-step procedure is required. First, we estimate the change in effective tax rates as a result of the taxable value growth limit. Then we estimate the effects of the effective tax rate on the probability of a property being sold. With these two estimates, we can calculate the effect of the taxable value growth limit on the length of ownership.
Recall that the taxable value growth cap may lower effective tax rates the longer a property owner retains ownership. The first step is to estimate the effect of years of ownership on effective tax rates. We note that the relationship between years of ownership and effective tax rates is likely non-linear. 24 We therefore use the natural logarithm of years of ownership as our key independent variable. Consider Table 3 , which reports 22 The choice of the 8.5 percent interest rate is about the average interest rate for a 30-year fixed rate mortgage over the 1970-2010 period. More detail on the calculation of the percent equity measure is available from the authors upon request. 23 Traditional lending institutions are reluctant to lend amounts of less than $40,000. For example, in our data if one purchased a $40,000 property in 2007 with cash, they would be designated as having full equity; there were many such sales in our data. 24 The change in effective tax rates depends on the growth in a property's SEV over time and the date at which an owner purchased the property. We thank the editor for offering this insight. Note that in this regression we cap the number of years owned at 16 because tax savings associated with ownership begin to accrue after the imposition of the taxable value cap in 1994.
an effective tax rate regression in which the key variable of interest, ln(Years Owned Capped), is negative and statistically significant. 25 That is, the effective tax rate is lower the longer an owner retains the property. For homestead properties owned since 1994 (the date of taxable value growth cap implementation), effective tax rates are about 30 mills (or 48 percent) lower than they would have been otherwise. As discussed earlier, a property owner stands to lose the tax benefit he/she currently enjoys upon sale of a property. Given that the average tax payment is about $1,500, this amounts to an annual tax savings of about $600. According to this first part of our evaluation, it seems that there is a substantial incentive to retain ownership for many homeowners. The control variables are of interest as well. Older and larger homes have lower effective tax rates, whereas properties with larger lots have higher effective tax rates. These results are generally in line with expectations. Old, large homes are less likely to be sold and thus do not experience "pop up" effects as often, which results in lower effective tax rates. On the other hand, larger lots are more desirable and are more likely to be sold and thus have higher effective tax rates. Note that we will use the coefficient on years of ownership to calculate the millage reduction resulting from the taxable value cap, which will in turn be used to determine the effect of the effective tax rate on the probability of selling a property, which is discussed next.
We estimate the probability of selling a property as a function of effective tax rates while controlling for a number of property and neighborhood characteristics. To inform and guide our empirical strategy we present a simple model put forth by Hanushek and Quigley (1978) and Ihlanfeldt (2011) , where the probability of a property selling is equal to the probability that an owner will put his/her property up for sale (P(U)) Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and all regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
times the conditional probability that if the property is for sale, a buyer is found (P(B/U)),
The probability of offering a property for sale depends on the loss of utility from being at a suboptimal level of housing consumption (H*) and moving costs (MC). The property owner puts his/her property up for sale when the utility loss from living at a suboptimal level of housing exceeds moving costs,
To determine the effect of the taxable value cap on the probability of moving, we include a range of variables that control for differences in P(U) across property owners, property characteristics, and neighborhood characteristics. The tax savings resulting from the taxable value cap are embedded in MC; moving requires that one give up any tax benefit that has been acquired over time.
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We estimate the probability of a property being sold with a standard probit estimation procedure. The core results are presented in Table 4 where, in addition to the effective tax rate, we include as control variables property characteristics, years of ownership, 27 and neighborhood indicator variables. Table 4 presents three regressions where each includes one of three proxy variables for being underwater: An underwater indicator variable (Column 1), percent equity (Column 2), and two indicator variables that indicate being underwater and having partial equity (Column 3) where full equity is the omitted reference indicator variable.
Before considering the variable of interest, Effective Tax Rate, we first discuss the control variables. Larger homes are more likely to be sold than smaller homes, all else equal. Properties that are delinquent on their property taxes are less likely to be sold. One possible explanation for this result is that tax delinquency may serve as a barrier to selling until such time that back-taxes are paid. Consider now the estimated effects of equity on the probability of a home selling. In Column 1, we include an indicator variable that equals 1 if the property is underwater, and 0 otherwise. In Column 2, we replace the underwater indicator variable with estimated equity in the home, and in Column 3 we include the negative equity indicator as well as a partial equity indicator variable. In Column 1 we see that being underwater decreases the likelihood of selling relative to those with partial or full equity. In Column 2 we obtain a similar result: those with more equity are more likely to sell. These results are consistent with previous research that shows that low or negative equity tends to create a lock-in effect.
In Column 3, however, a more nuanced result emerges. Here we see that the negative equity indicator is statistically insignificant, whereas the partial equity indicator is positive and highly significant. That is, those with partial equity are more likely to sell relative to those with full equity. This result may in part be the due to the fact that many of the recent sales have been for cash. Finally, the longer a property is owned, the lower is the probability of home sale. In our analysis, controlling for years owned is important in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of the taxable value growth cap on the probability of home sale. 28 While the coefficient estimates on the control variables are of interest, the focus in this article is on the role the assessment growth cap plays in mobility. We now turn our attention to this question.
Controlling for other factors, we see that the coefficient on effective tax rates is positive and statistically significant in all three regressions. That is, a lower effective tax rate reduces the probability of home sale. From these estimates, it appears that the lock-in effect is occurring. The size of the coefficient on the effective tax rate is similar across all three columns. The marginal effects generated from the effective tax rate coefficients are also presented at the bottom of Table 4 ; the marginal effect of the effective tax rate from the homestead property regression ranges from 0.0006 to 0.0007. A 1 mill increase (decrease) in the effective tax rate increases (decreases) the average probability of selling a property by 0.06 to 0.07 percent. Though the magnitude of the coefficient may seem inconsequential upon initial examination, the size of the effect is in fact large. However, several steps are required to assess the magnitude of the effect.
By combining the results from Tables 3 and 4 , we can calculate the change in tenure as a result of the assessment growth cap. From the estimates in Table 4 , Columns 2 and 3, the probability of selling a property decreases by about 0.06 percent as a result of the reduced effective tax rate generated from the assessment growth limit (a 30 mill reduction times the 0.0006 coefficient = 0.018. That is, property owners who have owned their property since 1994 and thus receive an average 30 mill reduction in the effective tax rate due to the taxable value growth cap have a 1.8 percent lower turnover rate. We must now compare this reduction with the average turnover rate for homestead properties in the City of Detroit. Following the method presented in Stohs, Childs, and Stevenson (2001) , average tenure length is calculated by taking the reciprocal of the property turnover rate. For example, if the turnover rate (percent of homes sold) in a given year is 10 percent, then on average a household remains in a home for 10 years (1.00/0.10).
In 2011 the turnover rate for Detroit homestead property not in tax or mortgage foreclosure was 4.7 percent. Based on this turnover rate, the average length of tenure is about 21 years.
29 A 1.8 percent reduction in the probability of home sale means that the turnover rate for these homeowners is reduced to 2.9 percent. This translates into an increase in the average duration of property ownership from 21 years to 34.5 years (1.00/0.029) for property owners who have owned their property since 1994, which is an increase in tenure length of about 64 percent. However, the average effect for all property owners (not just those who have owned their property since 1994) is an increase from 21 to 28.5 years, or about 35.7 percent. This estimate of the average effect is larger than the 25 percent estimate of Ferreira (2009) and the more modest 7 percent estimate from Ihlanfeldt (2011) . This analysis suggests a meaningful increase in the length of property ownership as a result of the assessment growth cap -evidence of a lock-in effect.
Given that the estimated magnitude of the effect is larger than the earlier studies, we are cautious in drawing definitive conclusions, and examine the data further. As noted earlier, the work of Hodge et al. (2015) demonstrates that city assessments over this period were much higher than actual market prices. It could therefore be that the coefficient estimate on our measure of effective tax rates defined as tax payment/(state equalized value/1000) is systematically affected by the inaccurate assessments. We therefore calculate an alternative measure of effective tax rates that is defined as tax payment/[(0.5*HPI adjusted sales price)/1000], 30 where the adjusted sales price is equal to the sales price at the time the property was last sold brought into 2009 terms using the City of Detroit housing price index data obtained from Core Logic. This method produced many significant outliers, primarily because there were so many extremely low sales prices and thus extremely high effective tax rates. We therefore applied the standard trimming method suggested by the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) to remove outliers. Specifically, the IAAO procedure for trimming is to delete observations outside 1.5 multiplied by the interquartile range (IQR), where the IQR is the difference between the first and third quartiles. After trimming, we are left with 67,986 observations, with 2.3 percent of the properties selling. Note, however, that this procedure only removed high effective tax rate observations. Recall that with the original data about 4.7 percent of properties sold; the trimming procedure eliminated relatively more recently sold properties than non-sold properties. This outcome is due 29 The rate of non-foreclosed property turnover in 2011 was lower than in previous years and the turnover rate with home foreclosures was 5.16 percent. Note that the calculated tenure length based on the rate of home sales is about nine years longer than the average years of ownership from the summary statistics reported in Table 3 . 30 The adjusted sales price is multiplied by 0.5 in order make this measure of effective tax rates consistent with the original measure; recall that in the original measure state equalized value is defined as 50 percent of estimated market value.
to the fact that many of the extremely low sales prices occurred during the period of examination. The estimates using this approach are presented in Table 5 . Before focusing on the revised effective tax rate variable, there are two notable issues that should be discussed with regard to the control variables. The first is that the coefficient on the underwater variable reverses signs and is positive (Column 1). However, as shown in Column 2 the coefficient on percent equity is still positive, indicating that those with more equity are more likely to sell than those with less equity. These two results seem to contradict each other, but the Column 3 estimate may reconcile the issue. These results indicate that both those with negative equity and partial equity are less likely to sell than those with full equity. However, the absolute magnitude of the coefficient on the partial equity variable is larger than the coefficient on the negative equity variable. That is, while both groups are less likely to sell than those with full equity, those with negative equity are more likely to sell than those with partial equity. The result in Column 1 is driven by the relative difference in the coefficient estimates between negative and partial equity. Taken together, we conclude that those with more equity are less likely to sell than those with less as shown in Column 2. The second difference is that the coefficient on years of ownership becomes positive. That is, the longer one owns a home the more likely he/she is to sell it. We are unsure of what is leading to the reversal in sign, but speculate that it may be due to the trimming procedure, which eliminated a larger proportion of recently sold homes.
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Turning to the effective tax rate measure, we see that the coefficient is still positive and highly significant, indicating that those with higher effective tax rates are more likely to sell. Note that the coefficients in all three columns are about half the size of those presented in Table 4 . However, the proportion of properties sold in the trimmed data set is also much smaller (reduced to 2.3 percent from 4.7 percent), and thus the magnitude of the estimated lock-in effect in percentage terms is similar in both sets of regressions.
The effect of the assessment growth cap on home sale probability can also be examined across different property value groups. Table 6 presents the coefficient and marginal effects for the original effective tax rate variable as used in Table 4 across property value quintiles where properties are ordered by sales price and are then grouped into the five categories. We expect the higher valued properties to be most susceptible to the lock-in effect as these properties are most likely to enjoy larger tax reductions as a result of the taxable value cap.
The results reported in Table 6 show that property owners with higher valued homes (as measured by SEV) are locked into ownership for longer periods than owners with lower valued homes. Specifically, the effective tax rate begins to be important in the 31 To explore this issue further, we re-estimated the Table 4 results using the subsample that generated the Table 5 estimates. The resulting coefficient on the effective tax rate is 0.0025***, which is similar to the Table 4 coefficient estimates. This additional information suggests that data trimming is leading to the difference in the magnitude of the coefficient. second quintile and the magnitude of the coefficient increases in the higher quintiles. However, variation in the magnitude of the effect across property value classes may not be solely attributable to the lock-in effect resulting from the assessment growth limit. The observed differences across property value groups may also be influenced by the fact that less expensive homes tend to be "starter" homes and thus average length of tenure may be less than more expensive "dream" homes. In addition to evaluating differential effects by property value class, we also consider differential effects across 10 geographic sub-areas within the city (called Neighborhood Clusters by the Detroit Planning and Development Department).
32 Given that housing price growth and decline varies across the city, we expect differential lock-in effects across space as well. In Table 7 , we present the estimates of 10 separate regressions, Notes: All regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. These estimates include all control variables but neighborhood effects are not included.
one for each of the 10 geographic clusters in the city. We find positive and statistically significant coefficients on the effective tax rate in eight of the 10 clusters, with the largest effect in Cluster 2. However, the 10 clusters are relatively large and heterogeneous, making it somewhat difficult to interpret the estimates in Table 7 . Generally, smaller effects were found in areas of the city that have been most severely affected by the collapse of the housing market. Clusters 1, 3, 5, and 6 have been subject to extensive foreclosures and increasing abandonments among single family homes. Cluster 4 has too few sales (and too few homestead properties) to produce significant results. The remaining areas of the city have been somewhat more stable, but all submarkets are to some degree stressed.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our general finding of decreased likelihood of property sale as a result of the assessment growth cap mirrors the conclusions of several previous studies, but our estimated effect is larger than other studies. Our examination has the advantage of using parcellevel data that include the actual tax benefits that homeowners enjoy as a result of the taxable value cap. These data enable us to consider differential effects across property value classes, as well as across space. Measuring the effects at the parcel level also offers a more precise measure of the impact because the benefit that properties receive from an assessment growth cap varies substantially within a single jurisdiction. Further, we examine the lock-in effect in the context of a declining urban area that is in the midst of a real estate crisis.
In the context of Detroit's current property assessment regime, our examination shows that the taxable value cap increases tenure length by about 36 percent. We also note that the effects differ by property value -no lock-in effect is found in the lowest quintile, but decreases in mobility are evident in the second to fifth property value quintiles, with large changes occurring in the third to fifth quintiles. These results show that the impacts of the taxable value growth cap differ substantially depending on circumstances. Generally, the findings suggest that the taxable value growth cap generates a significant reluctance among some property owners to sell their properties.
As with any empirical analysis, there are some caveats that should be discussed. First, there is considerable evidence that assessed values are substantially higher than they should be, given actual current market values. More accurate assessments would eliminate differences between SEV and TV for most properties. The unwillingness on the part of policymakers and assessors to allow assessed values to fully fall to reflect market conditions is in part due to incentives created by the taxable value cap. 33 Since increases in TV are limited to the rate of inflation (or 5 percent), applying subsequent percentage increases to a lower base will mean that property tax revenues will not recover to pre-decline levels when housing prices begin to trend upward; there is therefore a strong incentive on the part of local officials to keep TV and SEV from falling. This aspect of assessment practices may lead to bias in our estimated impact of effective tax rates on home tenure length. However, in robustness analysis where we modify the effective tax rate variable using actual sales price data, a lock-in effect still emerges. Second, even though we control for years of ownership, being underwater, and property/neighborhood characteristics, there is still the possibility of omitted variable bias for our coefficient on effective tax rates. While some caution is warranted in the interpretation of our findings, they offer new evidence of lock-in effect in the context of a faltering housing market.
As previously noted, our estimates are larger than those reported in previous studies. While we are unsure why our estimated effects are larger, we offer two possible explanations. First, Detroit has one of the highest property tax rates in the country. It may be that the perceived tax benefits of the assessment growth cap and thus the lock-in effect is magnified compared to lower tax jurisdictions. In addition, average household income in Detroit is just $25,000; as a percent of income the tax savings generated by the assessment growth cap is substantial and this again may serve to magnify the lock-in effect.
While Detroit is in some ways an exceptional case, this analysis may be of interest to other struggling urban areas around the country. Importantly, with unemployment near 20 percent, the taxable value growth cap may inhibit appropriate moves to obtain employment, thus exacerbating the spatial mismatch/unemployment problem. The efficiency costs of the taxable value growth cap in a city experiencing significant economic challenges are potentially substantial. While there is a temptation to think that reduced mobility might be good in the context of significant population out-migration, in a broader context the taxable value growth cap inhibits moves that could ultimately improve both labor and housing market outcomes. Years Owned Uncapped Number of years owned by the current property owner.
APPENDIX A: VARIABLE NAMES AND DEFINITIONS

Years Owned Capped
Number of years owned by the current owner since the adoption of Proposal A in 1994
